provisions as providing in themselves all the necessary materials for the resolution of the dispute, isolated from political and policy disputes. Secondly, Courts anticipate political reactions to their decisions, trying to limit negative reactions.
This second tactic comes closest to providing an explicit and robust thesis to explain the behaviour of the Courts beyond the logic of the law itself, and interpreting the Courts as strategic actors. More directly, other authors (Clinton; (Carrubba; 2000; have presented Courts as strategic actors whose basic aim is to reinforce their own role and authority within a given legal setting. In the EU context, this implies that judges and Courts will seek to extract advantage (in terms of their own authority) from the integration process (Garrett et al; . More nuanced approaches argue that court decisions depend not only on anticipating choices which may be made by other actors, but also on the strategic goals that the Courts may pursue, and the institutional setting in which the Courts´ own choices are made (Epstein and Knight; 2000) . This is precisely the approach that this paper takes. The next section sets the theoretical background of the so-called implementation problem, which refers to the calculation that Courts have to make concerning the likelihood of a sentence being implemented.
The following two sections summarise the institutional features of Higher Courts (3) and the institutional requirements for constitutional reform (4), which may provide explanatory variables linked to the institutional setting of Courts. Section 5 presents the decisions of the Courts and their strategies (either argumentative or procedural); section 6 relates them to institutional features; and section 7 explains decisions in relation to the institutional obstacles to their implementation. I argue that Courts tend to avoid a sentence of unconstitutionality when the requirements for constitutional amendment are very high (i.e. the intervention of veto players). The conclusions summarize the argument and suggest further lines of research.
Institutional determinants of decisions of Higher Courts: the implementation problem
This paper argues that the institutional environment constrains and affects Court decisions (Vanberg; 2001:346) . The institutional context is particularly important given the so-called "implementation problem" (Rosenberg; 1991) ; i.e. the fact that Court rulings need to be transferred into legislation. Hence, implementation requires the active participation of actors other than the Court itself. The implementation problem proves particularly acute when courts adjudicate on the constitutionality of an EU reform Treaty: in the case of a negative verdict, Courts are aware of the institutional background conditioning implementation. Courts know that EU treaties, once signed, have to be accepted in toto and they do not allow partial derogations introduced during the ratification process (de Witte; 2004) . This means that procedures for resolving an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality involve either constitutional reform or renegotiation of the treaty in order to modify the contested provisions. But since renegotiation depends on acceptance by other governments/states, meaning that all other states will bow to the Court ruling, implementation depends basically on domestic constitutional reform. Courts know the domestic requirements for constitutional revision, and they may also be aware of the preferences of political actors with regard to both ratification and constitutional reform. Normally, rules for constitutional amendment almost always prescribe requirements which are more stringent than a legislative majority; they may, for example, also involve veto players, i.e. referendums and/or intervening elections. Additionally, courts also know how "externalities" may effect an eventual declaration of unconstitutionality: given the requirement for unanimity, an eventual negative decision may halt or even cancel ratification for the whole of the EU. Thus, while prima facie cases concerning the constitutionality of EU reform treaties provide a golden opportunity for Courts to deliver powerful decisions that assert the supremacy of national constitutions and enforce profound constitutional amendments, the rules for constitutional reform clearly establish the implementation costs conditioning the Courts' decisions and, in this way, may eventually limit their ambition. Hence, ratification presents a moment at which the institutional constraints for the implementation of court decisions are fully visible, and a good moment to test whether they may affect the Courts' decisions. This paper examines all Higher Court decisions on the constitutionality of EU reform treaties (all the so-called "grand bargains" from the SEA to Lisbon) during the ratification process. The Treaties considered include those from the ECSC Treaty (1951) to the Treaty of Lisbon. Together with the usual cases (i.e. SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and the EU Constitution), the EDC Treaty is also considered, since it triggered two challenges before the German Constitutional Court. Four treaties, the ECSC Treaty, the EEC/EAEC Treaties, and the Treaty of Nice did not call for any demand for rulings from the Courts. Altogether, Higher Courts have ruled in 36 cases assessing the compatibility of new reforms with the domestic constitutional order (see Table 2 below). Taking into account the ever growing number of Member States, and the continuous pace of treaty reforms, the figure is not large. The increase in the number of constitutional jurisdictions brought about in successive enlargements may give an immediate explanation for the growth of cases and, tellingly, the Lisbon Treaty concentrates 42.5% of these (i.e. 17).
Accession Treaties, on the other hand, have been also challenged before Higher Courts in 4 cases: Poland, Latvia, Estonia and the Czech Republic. These treaties pose a similar implementation problem, although there are some significant differences: namely, if a CC/HC forces a constitutional revision on accession, the would-be member state assumes the full cost of not implementing the decision, and there is no externalization effect. Thus, these four cases can be added to the sum total of cases to bring the count to 40. On the other hand, rulings concerning domestic acts in relation to EU law also raise interesting issues: the German Constitutional Court sentence against Eurobonds, the Polish Constitutional Court limitation of "direct effect", or the Czech Constitutional Court limitation on the use of fundamental rights all illustrate compelling cases of sentences against EU law. They, however, present a very different implementation problem to that of the declaration of unconstitutionality of a Treaty and, hence, they are not integrated into our research. No doubt a fruitful avenue in the future may be to compare sentences with different implementation problems.
Institutional design of official bodies responsible for the constitutionality of treaties
Higher Courts are a constant feature in all Member States, although their design varies widely. Three criteria determine the institutional configuration of the Courts controlling the constitutionality of EU reform treaties. The first is the nature of the jurisdiction (i.e. ordinary or specialized), the second is the moment of control (i.e. ex ante or ex post ratification) and the third refers to the legitimated subject (i.e. the subject that may trigger constitutional revision). 
Ex ante and ex post modalities of control
The second institutional feature is the moment at which control is exercised:
most member states (19) have the option of examining the constitutional compatibility of Treaties before their approval by the national parliament (preliminary or ex ante control). The remaining member states have foregone this option, and in Luxembourg and the Netherlands control of the constitutionality of treaties is excluded. While ex ante control is associated mainly with constitutional courts, ordinary jurisdictions more usually act with ex post control, although preliminary control exists in several states. A different, although related, issue refers to the object of control: in forms of direct control, courts directly examine the constitutionality of a Treaty, while in indirect control, only the revision of the ratifying law is permitted. In practice, this second option has no real significance since courts have normally taken advantage of the revision of the ratifying law in order to extend the process to the treaty itself.
Legitimated subjects
The third institutional characteristic is the legitimated subject which activates a claim before the Court: when there is a preliminary ruling acting as a mechanism of constitutional control the intervention of the courts is not automatic. On the contrary, Table 2 identifies the actual claimant in each specific case.
Although this paper does not focus on their motives, it is worth noticing that political actors have increasingly found that the courts may be used to serve different strategic goals: to impede or halt ratification; to trigger a restrictive interpretation on the treaty or to promote institutional changes, etc. The following paragraphs describe the presence of different subjects in different processes: while the executive tends to use appeals to secure its pro-ratification stance, legislatures and, particularly, citizens tend to use appeals to impede ratification. The position of Presidents in this regard is less clear-cut, and there are examples of actions taken in both directions. 
Legislatures as triggers: constitutional appeal as an instrument of opposition

Presidential prerogative to launch Court appeals as a counter power
Government containment strategy may be altered when the President retains the prerogative of demanding a preliminary ruling on the constitutionality of the treaties and decides to use it. This option exists in 9 member states. In three of these, i.e.
Germany, Poland and Portugal, the President may act on the parliamentary ratification law, while in the Czech Republic and Poland Presidents may request a preliminary ruling on the treaty itself prior to its signature. This is functionally equivalent to the former cases.
Presidents have used this prerogative in three countries (Germany, France and the Czech Republic). French Presidents have requested preliminary rulings on all EU reform Treaties since Maastricht. In none of these cases have French Presidents contradicted the government's position; they sought rather to smooth ratification of the treaty through the identification of the specific elements for constitutional reform following these treaties. Reasonably, the court considered the question "premature". Once the Court had pronounced itself on a previous Senate appeal and once parliament had completed ratification, President Klaus challenged the Treaty a second time before the CC. The
Court rejected his claims and reaffirmed its former verdict.
Citizens as triggers of appeals
Citizen (i.e. non institutional agent) appeals are the main source of action against EU Treaties in ratification processes, and account for 21 occurrences (see Table 2 ). Of course, political actors such as MPs may also use this procedure for themselves and, in fact, this has happened on several occasions. Citizen intervention is naturally and logically associated with the existence of ordinary jurisdictions and with ex post forms of control. However, citizens in Ireland (SEA), Denmark (Maastricht) and the UK (Treaty of Lisbon) have requested ex ante court action. In Ireland, after completing the parliamentary procedure for ratification, an individual named Raymond Crotty brought a case before a High Court and secured an injunction that prevented the government from lodging the instrument of ratification. In Denmark, citizens twice challenged the constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty, and in the UK citizens also launched two challenges against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (the first was Conservative MP Bill Cash; the second business tycoon Stuart Wheeler).
A priori, constitutional jurisdictions are designed as a mechanism for interinstitutional arbitration; hence citizens do not have a strong position as claimants. Ras and Congleton (2006) conclude that the number of veto players have systematic effects on the amendment rates of (OECD) countries: amendment rates fall when requirements include intervening elections and/or referenda.
Several Member States (such as France, Latvia, Spain or Slovakia) have more than one amendment procedure, depending on the part of the Constitution affected. In this paper, each court case is associated with the eventual or actual procedure used or invoked in the specific case (see Table 3 ). In France, the use of a referendum instead of the 
Court decisions denying the necessity of constitutional reform: cases and strategies
In 32 out of the 40 cases considered, Courts did not recommend constitutional reform. In order to reach such decisions, Courts pursued different paths that were not necessarily mutually exclusive and, in fact, in some cases they combined them. Rulings which did not recommend constitutional reform fell within the following four categories: either the Court used procedural instruments to avoid ruling (5.1); or they ruled with strict adhesion to the request, not exploring additional contentious issues (5.2); or they ruled on the constitutionality of the treaty together with a strong restrictive doctrinal interpretation (5.3); or they called for alternative reforms to the constitutional one (5.4). Germany-a politically undesirable outcome which the Court was understandably not disposed to provoke. Loewenstein concludes that the Court perhaps found it was best to drag its feet and to wait for impending elections, after which the issue could be resolved by constitutional amendment. In deciding to wait, the judiciary sensibly saved face and perhaps even its own neck (Loewenstein; 1955: 837) . And in fact the passage of time Similarly, the French Constitutional Court used the timing of its ruling on the EU Constitution to avoid political interference with ratification. By coming to an unexpectedly quick decision, the Conseil deliberately sought to avoid interfering with the ongoing campaign inside the Socialist Party. Given that Party members were invited to vote on 1 st December, a decision published on the very eve of that vote-or after itmight have been either wrongly interpreted, or troubling in its impact. Conversely, the outcome of the referendum was not influenced because the decision had been known, analysed and commented upon one week prior to voting -the best that could be hoped for under such circumstances (Carcassone, 2005: 294) .
Exploitation of procedural opportunities
The second procedural instrument for avoiding an explicit ruling is admissibility.
On the occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Belgian Council of State, which has an advisory capacity, considered that the Treaty (specifically, the EU citizens' right to vote) contradicted the constitutional reserve of the electoral rights for Belgian citizens, and hence it recommended that the Constitution be revised before ratification. The government immediately made it clear that it did not intend to proceed with constitutional reform and this was, according to Delpérée (1992: 
Strict adhesion to the request
In a number of cases, courts have clearly restricted themselves to examining the exact and precise object of the demand, without further consideration of the in requesting that the Conseil scrutinise the compatibility of the two texts, Chirac left the Conseil free to determine its own approach to the question. Thanks to this astute move by the President, the judges were able to select only those issues they thought necessary to underline, something which probably spared many pointless discussions 
No constitutional recommendation issued, but a doctrinal warning
An attractive alternative to demanding constitutional reform is the use of legal reasoning to identify clear limits and conditions which may not be breached in the future. Thus Courts do not completely renounce their own role as masters and controllers of the process, but select a "warning" strategy. Interpretative rulings transfer the implementation problem to the future.
The German ruling on Maastricht represents the paradigm of this position. The
Court identified the limits to the transfer of sovereignty to the EU and established that in future it would be prepared to control and fix these limits. Most commentaries on this verdict have rightly emphasized the ideological elements that informed it. Just as important, however, is the context surrounding the sentence: with the plaintiff demanding a preventative injunction, suspension would have been a powerful psychological blow, since the Danish and British ratifications were still pending.
However, the Court rejected the injunction on the implicit understanding that there would be a speedy resolution of the case. Notwithstanding, this expectation was frustrated and the Court took 10 months to resolve the case. Again in the case of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court established the limits to European integration, the conditions for the exercise of joint competence under the principle of conferral, and the right of the Federal Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of EC and EU law, and it did so using very assertive wording.
Similarly, the Czech Constitutional Court also issued an embedded warning in relation to the Lisbon Treaty, although it was much more contained. While it ruled unanimously that the specific objections of the Senate against the constitutionality of the Treaty were ill-founded, the Court made it clear that this decision did not rule out its possible unconstitutionality in a total sense. In any case, the ruling avoided a constitutional amendment which would be very difficult to achieve, given the threefifths requirement and the composition of both chambers (with the first chamber evenly split between government and opposition). The second ruling confirmed the essential aspects of the first, and explicitly criticized the President for his questioning of the notion of "shared sovereignty". To do so, the Court quoted a memorandum of the Czech government at the time when Klaus himself was Prime Minister, implicitly defending the notion of "shared" sovereignty. However, the Court warned that it could function as an ultimate arbiter, and might review whether any act by Union bodies exceeded the powers transferred by the Czech Republic to the European Union.
Seeking alternatives to constitutional reform: imposing legislative changes
Only one case, the ruling of the German Constitutional Court on the Lisbon 
Court decisions requesting Constitutional revision
Given the background of disputes and the general difficulty of coordination between orders, one might expect to see a large number of cases in which courts In all other cases, the effects of the court ruling limited themselves purely to the treaty under examination. In 1992, the French Constitutional Court found that the Maastricht Treaty could not be ratified unless the Constitution was amended, and allowed for sovereignty to be ceded in the following matters: EU citizens' rights in local elections, economic and monetary union, and immigration from outside the Community (Oliver; 1994: 15) . In order to do so, the Court took the bold step of breaking with the old distinction between limitation and transfer of powers. 
Institutional factors and Higher Court decisions
The have made citizens rather than legislative minorities the main trigger for the involvement of the Courts.
As far as the type of jurisdiction and the moment of control are concerned, the figures and their distribution do not show any clear pattern: 30 cases in constitutional jurisdictions (26 with a negative sentence and 4 with a positive one), 6 in ordinary jurisdiction (5 no and 1 yes) and 4 in special ones (3 yes and 1 no).
Institutional factors in affirmative Court decisions
All cases in which constitutional reform was an immediate and direct consequence of court rulings contain the following institutional features: procedures of constitutional reform not requiring the intervention of veto points (via either referendums or intervening elections); appeals activated by the executive (or in the case of Finland, activated by an automatic process); and adjudication taking place in specialized jurisdictions. These three features constitute a model of behaviour in the case of Higher Courts adjudicating on cases referring to the ratification of EU reform treaties.
Only the Irish case provides evidence of a positive sentence (i.e. one demanding constitutional reform) which departs from this model. The Irish case differs in three aspects: a citizen activated the demand, an ordinary jurisdiction managed the case and constitutional reform required a referendum. These three features contradict the basic model and, in fact the Irish ruling in the Crotty case in 1987 came as a great surprise for many and triggered considerable criticism. Firstly, against all expectations the Court held the claim to be admissible: the safeguarding of citizens' rights to raise constitutional issues prevailed over the government's commitment to ratify on a given date. Rather surprisingly, since the High Court had never previously issued an order restricting the exercise of treaty-making power by the government, an interlocutory injunction was granted (Temple Lang; 1987: 709) . Even then, the decision was not unanimous: with three votes to two, the majority argued that Title III of the SEA would jeopardize the Irish policy of neutrality. Moreover, in the opinion of one of the judges, it would commit Ireland to a programme that would progressively usurp Irish independence and sovereignty (sic) (Murphy; 1988: 375) . Dissenting opinions held that the consent on accession in 1972 also implied an authorization for future amendments, as long as these did not alter the essential scope and objectives of the Community. The ruling prompted strong critical reactions in the Dáil, with some deputies arguing that the Court had overstepped the line of separation of powers and had granted itself the power to review treaties not foreseen in the Constitution. More radical opinions viewed the sentence as an intromission of the judiciary into a domain reserved for the legislative and the executive organs (Murphy; 1988: 376-379 In summary, verdicts declaring an EU reform treaty to be against the constitution are, in all cases, ex ante controls. When the constitutional amendment procedure requires the intervention of a veto player, or a referendum and/or intervening elections, 
Conclusions
Given certain institutional contexts, Courts cannot be totally aloof from the consequences of their rulings, and more specifically from what these rulings require in order to be implemented. In relation to rulings on the ratification of EU reform treaties, evidence indicates that Courts have decided that Treaties are against the constitution in very few cases. Strictly speaking, this has only happened in three member states: in France (three times-in 1992 , 2004 ), in Spain (1992 and in Ireland (1986) , plus the two cases from Finland. This suggests that Courts seem to be aware of the eventual consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality, and what is required for such a declaration to be implemented. Courts do not seem particularly oriented towards constitutional reform in relation to treaties. two successive votes by two different parliaments, evidence suggest that Court rulings have not called for constitutional reform. Thus, there is a relation between rulings and the stringency of the constitutional revision procedures. Courts seem to seek an accommodation between legal orders during the ratification of EU treaties, because they seem to be consistently aware of the institutional context of their decisions (i.e. the rigidity of constitutional reform rules) which very clearly set the "costs of implementation". This is merely a partial finding in relation to the disputes on EU law. Higher
Courts may decline to fight in relation to treaties during periods of ratification, but this does not mean that they do not attempt to rule against EU law. Such efforts can be channelled, for instance, through mechanisms such as strong interpretative verdicts or parallel domestic reforms (see section 5.1). This kind of behaviour fits neatly with the indirect and prospective impact of the judicialization hypothesis: the Court signals how similar disputes may be resolved in the future, and hence future rulings affect lawmaking activity (Stone Sweet, 2000: 201) , transferring the implementation cost to the future. This also grants a margin of freedom to the Court itself, since interpretation may be modulated, changed or even reversed at a later stage (as, for instance, the Spanish Constitutional Court has done in relation to pre-judicial questions). Alternatively, Courts may choose to pursue their battle when the institutional environment is such that a negative ruling has a lower implementation cost (for instance, in those environments related to secondary legislation such as regulations, directives or framework decisions).
In either case, the institutional environment framing Court decisions and raising specific implementation costs should be taken into account for a proper theory of constitutional judicial politics.
